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ABSTRACT
This article studies the law and economics of cooling-off periods
and secondary markets for online media. The discussion is fueled
by a current debate: In July 2009, the online retail juggernaut,
Amazon.com, remotely deleted literary classics from consumers’
portable “Kindle” reading devices. The public outcry and classaction lawsuit that followed have reinvigorated an ongoing debate
about how much control digital media distributors should wield.
Pundits and plaintiffs argue that too often, digital distributors like
Amazon impair consumer freedom by misusing Digital Rights
Management (DRM) software systems. However, these same
systems could also provide significant benefits that have largely
gone ignored. This article argues that, with the help of DRM,
lawmakers could provide for cooling-off periods and nurture
secondary markets for downloaded media that would benefit
consumers, copyright holders, and digital distributors.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In July of 2009, thousands of copies of George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four
mysteriously vanished into thin air. The novel describes a government that censors books
by destroying them, but the culprit of “2009” wasn’t Big Brother — it was the nation's
largest online retailer, Amazon.com.1
In a decision that surprised and angered owners of the “Kindle” electronic
reading device, Amazon remotely deleted e-book versions of Nineteen Eighty-Four and
other classics that customers had already purchased.2 This disappearing act was made
1

See, e.g., Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books From Kindle, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2009, at B1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html; Geoffrey A.
Fowler,
Kindle's
Orwellian
Moment,
WALL
ST.
J.,
July
17,
2009,
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/07/17/an-orwellian-moment-for-amazons-kindle/; Richard Waters, Digital
Ownership, FIN. TIMES, July 22, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fbe93b60-7655-11de-9e5900144feabdc0.html; Davil L. Ulin, Amazon's Troubling Reach, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2009,
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/. See also David Pogue, Some E-Books Are More
Equal Than Others, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2009, http://pogue.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/some-ebooks-are-more-equal-than-others/; Geoffrey A. Fowler, Buyer's E-Morse: ‘Owning’ Digital Books,
WALL
ST.
J.,,
July
23,
2009,
at
A11,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124830307703373747.html; Jonathan Zittrain, Lost in the Cloud, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2009, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/opinion/20zittrain.html;
All Things Considered: Amazon's ‘1984’ Deletion From Kindle Examined, (NPR's radio broadcast July 24,
2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=106989048 (discussing Amazon's
book deletion with Jonathan Zittrain, professor of law at Harvard Law School and cofounder of the
Berkman Center for Internet and Society and touching more broadly on society's changing understanding of
ownership
in
the
age
of
digital
downloads);
Top
500
Retail
Websites,
http://www.internetretailer.com/top500/list.asp (naming Amazon the nation's largest online retailer).
2
See generally supra note 1. See also Amazon, Kindle Community, Discussions,
http://www.amazon.com/tag/kindle/forum/ref=cm_cd_pg_newest_encoding=UTF8&cdThread=Tx1
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possible by Digital Rights Management (“DRM”) software that allowed Amazon to send
a “delete” command across its wireless network.3 The bookseller later explained that it
had removed the books due to a legal issue involving the publisher.4
Not even a full refund and a public apology from Amazon's CEO, Jeff Bezos,
quelled the public outrage that followed.5 Boycotts were quickly organized, and by the
end of the month, a class action lawsuit was filed.6 It seemed that everywhere, pundits
and plaintiffs alike were demanding that Amazon drop its use of DRM.7
Two years earlier, consumer freedom was at the center of a similar debate in
the world of digital media. In February of 2007, Steve Jobs, CEO of Apple Inc.,
published an open letter calling on record companies to free their music of DRM, which
was then widely used to curb illegal copying of music.8 Jobs argued that in a world
without DRM, consumers would have greater freedom to enjoy downloaded music on
different devices.9
QUP1NLUY4Q5M (last visited Sept. 5, 2009)(showing comments and complaints directly posted by
owners of the Amazon Kindle).
3
Stone, supra note 1; Fowler, supra note 1; Waters, supra note 1.
4
Fowler, supra note 1 (explaining that the publisher who made the e-book available on the Amazon
Kindle Store did not have the rights to do so in the United States); Waters supra note 1; Ulin, supra note 1;
All Things Considered: Amazon's ‘1984’ Deletion From Kindle Examined, supra note 1.
5
Posting
of
an
Apology
from
Amazon,
Jeffrey
P.
Bezos,
available
at
http://www.amazon.com/tag/kindle/forum/ref=cm_cd_et_md_pl?%5Fencoding=UTF8&cdForum=Fx1D7S
Y3BVSESG&cdMsgNo=1&cdPage=1&cdSort=oldest&cdThread=Tx1FXQPSF67X1IU&cdMsgID=Mx2
G7WLMRCU49NO#Mx2G7WLMRCU49NO (July 23, 2009)(“This is an apology for the way we
previously handled illegally sold copies of 1984 and other novels on Kindle. Our “solution” to the problem
was stupid, thoughtless, and painfully out of line with our principles. It is wholly self-inflicted, and we
deserve the criticism we've received.”) ..See also, Brad Stone, Amazon Faces a Fight Over Its E-Books,
N.Y.
TIMES,
July
27,
2009,
at
B3,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/technology/companies/27amazon.html.
6
Gawronski v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01084-JCC, 2009 WL 2364172 (W.D. Wash., July 30,
2009)(asserting causes of action for breach of contract, violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
Trespass to Chattels, Conversion, and violation of Washington state Consumer Protection laws). On
September 25, 2009 the parties settled their dispute. The terms of this settlement would require Amazon to
change its terms of service to guarantee that Amazon “will not remotely delete or modify” Kindle books
unless a user requests such deletion, fails to pay for a downloaded e-book, a judicial or regulatory order
requires such deletion, or if deletion is necessary to protect Amazon’s devices or network from malicious
code. Stipulation of Settlement and [Proposed] Order of Dismissal at 4, Gawronski v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
No. 09 Civ. 01084 JCC, WL 2009 3239326 (W.D. Wash., Sept. 25, 2009).
7
See, e.g., Corynne McSherry, The Kindle Lawsuit: Protecting Readers From Future Abuses, THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Aug. 5, 2009, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/08/kindle-lawsuitprotecting-readers-future-abuses. In early September 2009, Amazon offered to deliver new copies of the
deleted books to affected customers free of charge. See, e.g., Miguel Helft, Amazon.com Offers to Replace
Copies of Orwell Book, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009, at B2.
8
Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music, (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic/.
Just months following publication of Mr. Jobs’ open letter, the major record label, EMI, began selling
songs on iTunes free of DRM. See Jeff Leeds, EMI to Drop Digital Locks in Web Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
3, 2007, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/technology/03music.html.
9
Jobs, supra note 8. “Jobs stated, ‘any player can play [media] purchased from any store, and any store
can sell [media] which is playable on all players.’” Id. In part, Jobs' push for DRM was likely prompted by
events in Europe: Just two weeks before Jobs published his letter, the Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman,
Bjoern Erik Thon, issued a landmark ruling against Apple, holding that its use of DRM unfairly tied music
purchasers to Apple’s iPod music player. See Terje Solsvik & Wojciech Moskwa, Norway tells Apple
Change iTunes or Face Court, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 2007. One week later, consumer protection agencies in
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These recent events have generated a lively public debate over the degree of
control that digital media distributors should be permitted to exercise over their
products.10 Restrictive DRM systems and their misuse have occupied the spotlight in this
discussion. However, alongside their perils, DRM systems also have significant upsides
that have been largely overlooked: these systems could provide consumers with the
ability to return and to resell digital media.
Business laws in many nations provide “cooling-off” periods, during which
consumers may return purchases.11 In America, the right is limited to face-to-face sales
made in private homes, businesses, or convention halls, and only extends three days
following the date of purchase.12 In contrast, European cooling-off laws are more
expansive, and include a right of return for goods ordered over the Internet.13
Traditionally, such cooling-off periods only applied to tangible goods, and not
data-based services. However, a 2007 European Commission report questioned whether
digital sales contracts or license agreements (like those used by Amazon) should also be
subject to cooling-off statutes.14 This proposal raises an interesting question: is it really
possible to “return” a downloaded e-book, song, movie, or software program?
Technically, the answer is no. Unlike physical books or albums, downloaded
media only exists in the memory of electronic devices. As a result, the only way to
“return” digital media is with the help of software. Using DRM, sellers could allow
buyers to deactivate purchases within a cooling-off window.15
Such systems could also allow consumers to resell downloaded media.
Copyright’s First Sale Doctrine already grants this right to owners of physical books,

Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and France followed suit, launching a joint initiative to require digital
interoperability throughout the EU. See Toby Sterling, Netherlands Joins European Rebellion Against
Apple’s iTunes Rules, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan 25, 2007. At the same time, the European Commission was
advocating an EU-wide law mandating interoperability between digital media and playback devices. See
Communication From the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament and The European
Economic and Social Committee: The Management of Copyright and Related Rights in the Internal
Market,
Commission
of
the
European
Communities
(Apr.
16,
2004)
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/businesses/intellectual_property/l26116_en.htm.
Against this backdrop, it came as welcome news to many when Apple announced in early 2009 that it had
struck deals with major record labels that would allow it to offer millions of songs completely free of
DRM. See Press Release, Apple, Inc., Changes Coming to the iTunes Store, (Jan. 6, 2009),
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2009/01/06itunes.html; Brad Stone, Copy an iTunes Song? Go Ahead,
Apple Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009, at B1.
10
This Article frequently uses the term, “digital media” to refer to media (e.g., music, movies, books)
transported to consumers over digital networks (e.g., the Internet).
11
See generally Pamaria Rekaiti & Roger Van den Bergh, Cooling-off Periods in the Consumer Laws
of the EC Member States, J. CONSUMER POL’Y 371, 399 (2000) (presenting a table of the different types of
sales contracts and corresponding cooling-off periods for various EU nations).
12
See FTC Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period for Sales Made at Homes or at Certain Other
Locations, 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1995); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE COOLING-OFF RULE: WHEN AND
HOW TO CANCEL A SALE (May 1996), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/products/pro03.pdf.
13
See European Parliament, Directive 97/7/EC on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance
Contracts (May 20, 1997) [hereinafter The Distance Selling Directive]; Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra
note 11, at 399.
14
European Commission Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis, at 24, COM (2006) 744
final (Aug. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Green Paper].
15
This possibility and its challenges are discussed in greater detail in Section II.
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albums, and movies.16 In a sense, online distributors sidestep this rule by entering into
license relationships rather than truly transferring copy ownership.17 Some commentators
argue that this legal loophole should be closed because it violates consumer expectations
and the economic rationale behind the First Sale Doctrine.18 As with product returns,
DRM could make digital media resale possible.
Digital media distributors are widely criticized for their tendency to restrict
consumer choice.19 This Article explores how, with proper guidance, they could
accomplish the opposite—replacing rights that have been lost across the digital divide.
Part I studies cooling-off periods in the United States and the European Union and tells a
story that connects peddlers in colonial America to lawmakers in present-day Europe.
Going deeper, the discussion turns to consumer behavior—namely, why consumers
choose to return goods, and how this freedom strengthens markets. Part II similarly
analyzes the history of the right to resell copyrighted media in America and Europe and
discusses the surprising economic benefits that a digital resale market could generate.
Throughout this discussion, DRM systems that could provide digital returns and resale
are discussed. Part III draws parallels between the concepts of digital returns and digital
resale and notes the perils of excessive government involvement in establishing
technology standards.
II.

DIGITAL RETURNS
A. Cooling-Off Periods in America

Long before the age of digital downloads and “one-click” buying, consumers
had a simpler way of shopping from home: the door-to-door salesman. In colonial
America, many of the first such merchants were immigrants from Eastern Europe.20
Often based in the manufacturing centers of Connecticut, these “Yankee peddlers”

16

17 U.S.C.A. § 109 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
See Justin Graham, Preserving the Aftermarket in Copyrighted Works: Adapting the First Sale
Doctrine to the Emerging Technological Landscape, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2002), available
at http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/02_STLR_1.
18
See DEIRDRE MULLIGAN ET AL., HOW DRM-BASED CONTENT DELIVERY SYSTEMS DISRUPT
EXPECTATIONS
OF
“PERSONAL
USE,”
(2000),
available
at
http://groups.ischool.berkeley.edu/samuelsonclinic/files/DRM_personal_use.pdf. Governments looking to
standardize DRM face a difficult balancing act. Many technologists and legal experts agree that legislators
rarely have the technical knowhow to intelligently select standards. In the past, weak standardization
decisions by lawmakers have caused serious economic harm. For example, the Japanese government’s
unwise selection of an analog HDTV standard in the late 1980s is widely considered to have slowed the
development of digital television in Japan. On the other hand, too little government involvement could lead
to a market of splintered technologies. These topics are discussed in further detail in Part III.
19
See, e.g., Letter from Corynne McSherry, Staff Attorney, Electronic Frontier Found, to Federal Trade
Commission, FTC Town Hall: Digital Rights Management Technologies (Feb. 9, 2009),
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/DRM/DRMCOMMENTS_final.pdf.
20
See generally NICOLE WOOLSEY BIGGART, CHARISMATIC CAPITALISM: DIRECT SELLING
ORGANIZATIONS IN AMERICA 21 (University of Chicago Press 1989).
17
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carried teas, books, soaps, clocks, news and other necessities to those living in the
undeveloped countryside.21
The number of Yankee peddlers boomed in the first half of the nineteenth
century, but following the Civil War, door-to-door sales took a precipitous drop.22 In part,
this may have been due to the expansion of railroads: merchants who once relied on
peddlers gained the ability to order goods directly from wholesale distributors with the
confidence that shipments would arrive on time.23
Ironically though, the same swift commercial expansion that left door-to-door
salesmen out in the cold was responsible for their comeback: Large department stores of
the early twentieth century provided consumers with vast selections and choice, but many
manufacturers didn’t enjoy sharing shelf space with direct competitors.24 These
companies turned back to the practice of selling goods on doorsteps and in living
rooms.25 By the late 1920s, kitchenware, sewing machines, vacuums, encyclopedias,
religious books, textiles, shoes, and even automobiles were sold by direct-salesmen.26
Unfortunately, door-to-door salesmen sometimes behaved unethically. As the Senate
Committee on Commerce recognized in 1968, “no individual preys upon the elderly, the
poor, the ignorant, the gullible, or the softhearted as much as the unscrupulous door-todoor salesman.”27 Most often, such hucksters used well-rehearsed stories that played
upon home-dwellers’ sympathies or fears.28 A less common practice involved cultivating
carefully-calculated relationships with customers. By paying regular “friendly” visits and
appearing to take a personal interest in clients, these direct sellers extracted sales by
making consumers feel personally obligated to buy. This was a particularly effective
tactic for selling to the elderly and immigrants, many of whom felt uncomfortable
traveling to large urban department stores.29 Only upon cool reflection did the victims of
such pressure tactics wish they could somehow cancel their sales.30
By the 1960s, Congress recognized the need for a cooling-off period during which
consumers could cancel imprudent purchases. However, American lawmakers would
never envision this benefit broadly. An early bill introduced in the 1960s provided a twoday cooling-off period during which consumers could cancel purchases made in the home
as a result of uninvited sales visits.31 Several years later, an FTC regulation expanded the
21

Id.; David Jaffee, Peddlers of Progress and the Transformation of the Rural North, 1760-1860, 78 J.
AM. HIST. (No. 2) 511, (Sept. 1991); see also Priscilla Carrington Kline, New Light on the Yankee Peddler,
12 NEW ENG. Q. (No. 1) 80, (Mar. 1939) (discussing letters written by several early nineteenth-century
Connecticut peddlers that provide an intimate view of the everyday business challenges these sellers faced);
Joseph T. Rainer, The “Sharper” Image: Yankee Peddlers, Southern Consumers, and the Market
Revolution, 26 BUS. & ECON. HIST. (No. 1) 27, (1997).
22
See Jaffee, supra note 21, at 522 (discussing the boom in Yankee Peddlers seen in the first half of the
nineteenth century and citing United States census data reflecting 10,669 peddlers in 1850 and 16,594 in
1860); Jaffee, supra note 21, at 533 (discussing why the number of peddlers dropped after the end of the
Civil War).
23
BIGGART, supra note 20, at 23-26.
24
Id. at 22.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 22-23; S. REP. No. 90-1417, at 2 (1968) (discussing the Consumer Sales Protection Act).
27
S. REP. No. 90-1417 at 2.
28
BIGGART, supra note 20, at 23-26.
29
S. REP. No. 90-1417 at 2.
30
Id. at 3 (discussing several real-life examples of such buyer’s remorse).
31
See id. at 4 (discussing provisions of the Consumer Sales Protection Act).
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right slightly, by including situations in which salespersons had been invited prior to their
visits.32 The most recent version of the FTC cooling-off rule extends the period to three
days.33
The American cooling-off rule has never pertained to sales made via telephone or
the Internet. Like door-to-door sales, online purchases are arguably made “in the home.”
However, rule-makers remain unconvinced that an expansion of the rule is necessary. In
the mid-1990s, the FTC worked to update its cooling-off rule and sought public comment
on this question. In public hearings, several consumer advocacy groups argued that the
rule should be expanded to encompass all telephone and mail order purchases. However,
the FTC was unconvinced:
The Cooling-Off Rule was not intended to be a federal ‘satisfaction
guarantee’ requirement or ‘buyers’ remorse’ insurance program . . . The
Rule instead has the limited purpose of correcting the specific problem of
sales being obtained through high pressure and deceptive sales tactics used
on consumers at times and places in which consumers typically may not
expect to be solicited for sales and find it difficult to extricate themselves
from the situation.34
Most states have followed this rationale in enacting their own cooling-off laws. Some
readers may recall a commercial from the 1990s featuring an elderly woman who has
taken an unfortunate fall. Life-saving help arrives when she shouts unhappily into a
portable emergency bracelet, “Help! I've fallen and I can't get up!” California enacted a
seven-day cooling-off period for the door-to-door sale of such devices in 1992. Coolingoff rules enacted by other states have similarly been limited to sales made in the home.35
It could be argued that online pop-up ads and junk email are just as invasive and
deceptive as the unscrupulous salesmen envisioned by the FTC’s cooling-off rule.
Nevertheless, American purchasers of online music, movies, and software remain without
a right of return. However, as the next Section discusses, a cooling- off period for digital
goods is a distinct possibility in Europe. The result could have a significant and
surprising impact on American consumers and copyright holders.
B. Cooling-Off Period in Europe
Despite the speed and convenience the Internet brings to shopping, it still
presents a drawback: online shoppers cannot closely examine goods. This limitation has
caused frustration for consumers and vendors alike. For example, various sources suggest

32

See generally William L. Shanklin, Evaluating the FTC Cooling-Off Rule, 11 J. CONSUMER AFF. 101
(1977).
33
Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period for Sales Made at Home or at Certain Other Locations, 16
C.F.R
§
429;
About
the
FTC
Cooling-off
Rule
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/products/pro03.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
34
Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period for Sales Made at Homes or at Certain Locations, 60 Fed. Reg.
54,180, 54,184 (Oct. 20, 1995) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 429).
35
Colin Camerer, et al., Regulation For Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
“Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1241-2 (2003).
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that 20 to 40 percent of garments purchased online in recent years were eventually
returned due to sizing problems.36
Recognizing this problem, the European Commission has issued directives to
ensure that those who order tangible goods online are on equal footing with shoppers who
visit stores in person.37 The Distance Selling Directive, set forth in 1997, directs all EU
member states to require a cooling-off period of at least seven days for goods sold online.
Consumers need not justify or explain their returns, and may not be penalized.38
Since 1997, EU member states have worked to meet the Commission’s mandate,
but legal discord lingers. For example, Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Spain, and the
Netherlands have met the Directive’s minimum time requirement by enacting 7 day
cooling-off periods.39 However, Italy offers 10 days, and Sweden, Cyprus, Denmark and
Finland provide 14 days.40 Beyond differences in duration, the administration of coolingoff laws varies greatly between EU member states.41
Regulators at the European Commission believe this lack of uniformity erodes
consumer confidence. Ideally, consumers could shop online anywhere in the EU without
having to guess as to their right of return.42 In the course of solving this problem, the
Commission has recently taken new proposals under consideration.
Among these proposals is a directive that would require a right of return for
downloaded media. The concept was first introduced in the European Commission's 2007
Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis. Question “H1” in the Green Paper
read as follows:43

36

See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,469,218 col. 2 l.2-col. 2 l.4 (filed Apr. 14, 2003) (citing a return rate of
up to 40%); Simon Marks, A pioneer in online retail branches out, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/25/business/worldbusiness/25iht-wbspot26.html (citing a leading
retailers return rate at 25%). Some online retailers such as Zappos.com have turned this phenomenon to
their advantage by offering customers free returns.
37
See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the
European Economic and Social Committee on the Implementation of Directive 1997/7/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance
Contracts, at 5, COM (2006) 514 final (Sept. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Distance Selling in the EU]. The
Directive on Electronic Commerce, issued in 2000, requires online vendors to provide consumers with
important identifying information, including: the name and geographic and electronic address of the
vendor—Article 5(1)(a), (b), (c)—a clear indication of the price—Article 5(2)–and a clear, reproducible
copy of the sales contract terms and general conditions–Article 10(3). Council Directive 2000/31/EC, Art.
5,10, 2000 O.J. (L 178). See generally Copyright Law and Consumer Protection, The European Consumer
Law Group (2005), http://www.ivir.nl/publications/other/copyrightlawconsumerprotection.pdf [hereinafter
Copyright and Consumer Protection]. See also Commission Recommendation, 2005 O.J. (L 276) 54
(recommending cross-border policies for managing the rights of users who distribute copyrighted works
online).
38
See Distance Selling in the EU, supra note 37, at 5.
39
See id. at 19; Rekaiti, supra note 11, at 399.
40
See Distance Selling in the EU, supra note 37, at 19.
41
For example, there are differences in how some nations mark the event that triggers a cooling-off
period to begin tolling. Id. See also EC Consumer Law Compendium; Comparative Analysis (Dr. Hans
Schulte-Nolke et al., eds. 2000).
42
Green Paper, supra, note 14, at 3.
43
Id. at 24.
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H1: “Should the rules on consumer sales cover additional types of
contracts under which goods are supplied or digital content services are
provided to consumers?”
Option 1: Status quo: i.e. the scope of application would be limited to
sales of consumer goods, with the only exception of goods which are still
to be produced
Option 2: The scope would be extended to additional types of contracts
under which goods are supplied to consumers (e.g. car rental)
Option 3: The scope would be extended to additional types of contracts
under which digital content services are provided to consumers (e.g. online music)
Option 4: Combination of Option 2 and 3.
The European Commission solicited responses to this question from consumer and
business associations, Member States, the European Parliament, the European Economic
and Social Committee, and various stakeholders in the reforms under consideration.
Opinions were sharply divided.44 An overwhelming majority of legal
practitioners, academics, and consumer groups voted in favor of extending distance
selling rules (which include the EU’s cooling-off protections) to online media services,
while representatives from media and technology industry groups voted for the status
quo.45 When questioned more deeply, industry respondents expressed concerns that the
technological and administrative challenges involved might simply be too great.46 But
beyond these concerns lay a deeper and more vexing question: what degree of
involvement should legislators have in implementing the technologies (i.e., DRM) that
would make digital returns possible?47
Oddly, it was not noted that a separate group within the European Commission
was already addressing that very question. In July of 2006, the EU’s Directorate-General
for Information Society and Media announced a new project to combat online piracy.48
Prompted by disenfranchised copyright holders and consumers irked by compatibility
problems, the group questioned industry experts about the possibility of standardizing

44

See Commission Staff Working Paper: Report on the Outcome of the Public Consultation on the
Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis, Health & Consumer Protection Directorate General, at
3,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/acquis_working_doc.pdf
[hereinafter Working Paper].
45
Id. at 7-8.
46
Id.
47
Further, an interesting definitional question was raised: how can a directive that governs “sales
contracts” apply to digital media in the first place? After-all, services like iTunes do not purport to truly
“sell” content, but instead provide consumers with licenses to play it. The Commission conceded that
placing such licenses within the sweep of laws governing sales presents a legislative hurdle that should not
be taken lightly. See Copyright and Consumer Protection, supra note 37, at 12.
48
See Public Consultation on Content Online in the Single Market, European Commission, Information
Society and Media Directorate General (July 28, 2006) [hereinafter Single Market],available at
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/other_actions/col_question_en.pdf.
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DRM geared toward preventing illegal copying.49 These discussions led to a January
2008 announcement by Viviane Reding, EU Commissioner for the Information Society
and Media, who stated that the Commission planned to “establish a framework for DRM
transparency.”50 The import of this statement (and the group's May 2009 “Final Report”
which echoed the same words) was clear: the EU was planning to regulate DRM to
prevent illegal copying.
It is unfortunate that those involved with the cooling-off question did not
formally discuss Ms. Reding’s announcement. Both groups are essentially trying to solve
the same problem: how to regulate the alienation of digital property. It remains unclear
how the EU will face these challenges.
As the industry and the law remain in flux, it is helpful to examine the economic
advantages that cooling-off periods can provide. The next section reveals how a return
policy for downloaded media could add efficiency to the online marketplace.
C. Digital Cooling-Off: The Economics of Choice
Every morning in New York, thousands of people pass through a tight,
turbulent, urban knot called Times Square. There, at the “crossroads of the world,”
visitors may be reminded of another great global nexus: the Internet. (Where else but
online are “browsers” confronted with so many flashing banners and pop- up ads?) Like
the Internet, Times Square is a spectacle of light and noise; of speed and drama. And, like
the Internet, it is a marketplace.
One of the most recognizable sights in Times Square—as much a part of the
terrain as the twenty-foot-tall bottle of Coke that hovers above 48th Street—are bargain
electronics shops. Usually bathed in cold fluorescent light, the display windows of these
shops overflow with impossibly low-priced cameras, computers, and music players. Why
do these businesses thrive on Broadway and not, say, the Bronx or leafy Scarsdale? Do
certain environments prime shoppers to make unwise purchases? How and when are
cooling-off periods an appropriate remedy to such problems?
Questions like these are at the heart of a field known as Behavioral Economics.51
In contrast to the field of Classical Economics, which treats people as rational decisionmakers, the behavioral school embraces the fact that, often despite our best efforts, we
are imperfect creatures.52 We order chocolate ice cream, knowing that fresh fruit is
healthier; we fail to cancel unwanted magazine subscriptions out of sheer laziness. As a
nation, we have hobbled ourselves with debt born from irresponsible spending.
Recent studies on the psychology of spending show that our imperfect
tendencies can be aggravated in certain conditions—for example, when emotions are

49

See Public Hearing on Content Online in the Single Market, Hearing Before European Comm’n,
(Oct. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Public Hearing],available at
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/other_actions/hearing%20col/final_agenda_hear_col_en.pdf.
50
Press Release, European Comm’n, Comm’n Sees Need for a Stronger More Consumer-Friendly
Single Market for Online Music, Films and Games in Europe. Brussels (Jan. 3, 2008).
51
See e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (discussing concepts of Behavioral Economics).
52
See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not An Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1159, 1167-71 (2003).
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running high.53 Consumers in a “hot” mental state may overestimate how long they will
derive enjoyment from their purchases, and may overemphasize the importance and value
of short-term satisfaction.54 In part, this explains why shoppers browsing the web or the
chaotic streets of Times Square are so easily charmed and seduced by banners and
flashing lights.
People also make poor decisions when they cannot accurately gauge risk.55 As
anyone who has ever paid too much for a car, a suit, or a meal knows, some shopping
environments tend to lull purchasers into a sense of diminished risk. The case of door-todoor sales is a prime example.56 In the comfort of their homes, consumers may enter a
less deliberative state of mind, and become more trusting and receptive to strong sales
tactics.57 Arguably, the same conditions exist in the online marketplace. Most online
shoppers trustingly agree to “click-wrap” licenses without carefully considering the risks.
Only after the fact do many wish they had been more thoughtful.
Another cause of irrational spending stems from lack of information.58 This
often occurs when consumers cannot test goods prior to completing a sale. In the parlance
of economists, these situations present “informational asymmetries.”59 The experience is
familiar to anyone who has purchased ill-fitting clothing from a catalog, or software that
is incompatible with their computer. From an economic perspective, informational
asymmetries present a market-wide threat: when consumers cannot distinguish between
products of high and low quality prior to buying, market prices will tend to reflect the
lower quality. As a result, producers of high-quality products are slowly edged out,
leaving behind a market flooded with second-class goods.60
More broadly, irrational spending works against a basic goal of modern
economic policy known as “allocative efficiency.”61 Most simply, a state of allocative
efficiency exists when goods within a market move to their most valued purposes. When
consumers buy things they do not need, allocative efficiency is reduced, and market
failure may result.62
53

Id. at 1188.
Broadly, psychologists refer to this phenomenon as a failure in “affective forecasting.” Professors
Daniel Gilbert of Harvard and Tim Wilson of the University of Virginia have written leading work on the
subject. T.D. Wilson, J. Meyers, & D.T. Gilbert, Lessons from the Past: Do People Learn from Experience
that Emotional Reactions are Short Lived?, 27 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN, 16481661 (2001).Professor Gilbert also authored a popular book on the subject geared toward a non-technical
audience. DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (Random House 2007) (2006). See also Jon
Gertner, The Futile Pursuit of Happiness, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, at S6. Interestingly, recent research
suggests that the degree to which a person can envision his or her future-self has a meaningful impact on
present-day spending and investing habits. See Hal Ersner-Hershfield et al., Don’t Stop Thinking About
Tomorrow: Individual Differences in Future Self-Continuity Account for Saving, 4 JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING, 4, 280-86 (June 2009).
55
Rekaiti, supra note 11, at 376-78.
56
See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 52, at 1188 (stating that, in the case of door-to-door sales,
“cooling-off periods make the best sense,” in part because consumers may act impulsively in this setting).
57
Id.
58
See Rekaiti, supra note 11, at 379-81.
59
Id.
60
Id. (discussing how informational asymmetries may, in certain extreme cases, lead to market
collapse).
61
Id. at 374-75.
62
Id.
54
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Economists prescribe cooling-off periods to preserve market integrity in such
cases. Cooling-off periods that are even just a few days long, such as the one provided
by the FTC for door-to-door sales, grant buyers a chance for cool reflection and
meaningful evaluation of their purchases. Mandatory return policies can also encourage
sellers to make sure that buyers are fully-informed, and may decrease incentives to work
shoppers into “hot” states.64 These benefits should not be viewed as mere consumer
paternalism. As the wrenching financial collapse of 2008 and 2009 demonstrates,
irrational spending doesn't only harm buyers—it has the power to devastate economies.
The online marketplace for digital media appears to be an ideal setting for
mandatory cooling-off periods. Although the Internet is certainly less chaotic than 42nd
Street, it presents goods to consumers with a similar degree of ease. Plus, like the
electronics shops of Times Square, many online sellers present goods to consumers in a
fanfare of “one-click” speed, noise, and pop-up imagery designed to induce a “hot” state
of mind. Like the door-to-door sales for which cooling-off rules already exist, Internet
sellers reach consumers in their homes, where perceptions of risk are easily diminished.
Further, digital media has unique characteristics that make it even more suitable for
cooling-off than physical goods. For example, economists recognize that a right of return
is not feasible when goods depreciate in value during cooling-off windows.65 Digital
media, immutable by its very nature, cannot possibly depreciate in value due to
possession during a cooling-off window.
This leads to an interesting point: one might question whether allocative
efficiency can exist in a market of intangible “goods” that cannot be truly allocated or
exhausted. In considering this question, one must keep in mind that while bits and bytes
are infinite, capital is not. Thus the online marketplace is a realm where money, and not
goods, can be harmfully misallocated. For these reasons, both consumers and distributors
would benefit from a mandatory cooling-off window for digital media.
63

D. Digital Cooling-Off: Digital Rights Managemet
Having identified the benefits of cooling-off in the digital media market, it is
important to discuss how this feat could be accomplished. Unlike tangible goods, media
purchased online cannot truly be returned. This is because a downloaded file is not a
thing, but rather a state in which a computer’s memory may be ordered. And, just like
human memories, downloaded files can be shared and replicated infinitely. It is just as
impossible to return a downloaded song as it is to return a boring joke or a bad piece of
advice.
While vendors cannot force users to delete digital purchases, they can use DRM
software to simulate the effect of a product return by preventing a “returned” purchase
from playing. In this way, DRM adds a degree of tangibility to the otherwise ethereal
nature of digital media.
Although Amazon does not allow book returns on the Kindle, the company’s
recent book deletion debacle demonstrates how digital media can effectively be
63

See Camerer, supra note 35, at 1238. See generally Rekaiti, supra note 11. But see Id. at 381
(discussing several important disadvantages of cooling-off periods).
64
See Camerer, supra note 35, at 1240; Rekaiti, supra note 55, at 381.
65
See Camerer, supra note 35, at 1240.
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“returned.” There, books were remotely removed from the memory of Kindle electronic
reading devices across the country when Amazon sent a “delete” command across its
wireless network.66 Amazon then offered a full refund to those customers who were
impacted. In effect, Amazon accomplished a product return for downloaded media.
The company’s online video rental service demonstrates similar DRM
technology at work. Amazon Video On Demand, launched in February of 2007, offers a
convenient way to rent movies over the Internet. A consumer first selects from a library
of titles available on the Amazon website.67 Once a film is selected and paid for, it is
transmitted directly into the customer’s broadband-connected computer or set-top movie
player. The film, which is protected by DRM, “expires” 24 hours after it is first played.68
Apple has provided a similar film rental service since January of 2008.69
The same or very similar mechanisms could be used to effectuate returns across
a broader range of media. In fact, the only major change to this model would be a means
of refunding consumers who have deactivated (“returned”) media not yet viewed or
played within a cooling-off window. A European company, the Tiscali Music Group,
recently provided just such a service.70 Music purchased on Tiscali’s service was
protected by DRM software that permitted returns within the first seven days following
purchases.71
Of course, an effective product return system for digital media would need to
monitor whether books, films, and other media have already been viewed. Allowing
consumers to, say, return movies that have already been watched would run counter to
the entire economic rationale behind cooling-off. In the real world, worn pages and
broken plastic wrapping reveal when goods have been used. In the digital domain,
software can once again accomplish the same result. For example, the software behind
Amazon’s online rental business monitors whether downloaded movies have been
viewed. It would be necessary to incorporate similar capabilities into a DRM system used
for digital returns. Further, it may be necessary for regulators to establish different return
rules that apply to various types of digital media. For example, movies that have been
viewed should not be returnable, but perhaps computer games should be. Rule makers
would need to consider these issues with a keen awareness of consumer habits.
E. Summary and Implications
American cooling-off laws are rooted in a national history of pushy peddlers and
unscrupulous door-to-door salesmen. U.S. consumer interest groups have argued that a
right of return should also apply to “distance contracts” made via telephone or the
66

See supra, Introduction at notes 1-7.
See Amazon.com Video On Demand, http://www.amazon.com/video (displaying current titles
available for rent and explaining how the system works).
68
Id.
69
See, e.g., John Markoff, Enhancing Its Hits, Apple Adds Movie Rentals, UltralightLaptop, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16,2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/16/technology/16apple.html.
70
See THE BERKMAN CENTER AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, ITUNES CASE STUDY: OVERVIEW AND
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS, (2006);The Tiscali Music Club, http://www.tiscali.co.uk/music/ (linking to
services).
71
Jonny Evans, iTunes Dubbed Music Leader, PC WORLD, Mar. 30, 2004 (discussing the Tiscali
service and European cooling-off laws).
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Internet. However, Congress and the FTC remain unconvinced that such measures are
necessary.
In contrast, European lawmakers already provide a minimum right of return for
physical goods sold online, and the European Commission may go one step further by
allowing returns of downloaded media. If implemented wisely, such a law could
empower consumers and benefit online distributors by encouraging greater market
participation.
The difficulty inherent in building a system for digital returns could have
interesting international implications. If the European Commission mandates a digital
right of return throughout the EU, services like the iTunes Store and Amazon's Kindle
Store will be forced to create special systems to manage European returns. After
investing time and money into making this system work, these companies might decide to
avoid the bifurcated challenge of providing digital returns in Europe, but not elsewhere. It
might simply be more convenient to provide digital returns worldwide. Thus, a de jure
right of return in Europe could, by infusion, become a de facto standard of American
business.
In Europe and in America, a digital right of return would carry economic costs
and benefits. The initial cost of licensing DRM systems and retooling existing operations
could be high, an expense that might be passed along to consumers. However, as
discussed earlier, cooling-off periods bring economic efficiencies by ensuring that
consumer dollars are spent on the most highly-valued goods. Further, a cooling-off period
for digital media could increase consumer activity in this growing market. With the
knowledge that mistakes can be corrected, potential buyers might become more active in
the downloading of digital media.
III.

DIGITAL RESALE
A. First Sale in America

Isidor Straus was a respected American merchant, congressman, and co-owner
of Macy’s & Company from 1888 until his death aboard the Titanic in 1912.72 It is
extraordinary that a man so worthy of headlines was also partially responsible for the
birth of an important principle of copyright law: the First Sale Doctrine.
In 1908, Straus and Macy’s were sued for copyright infringement by the BobbsMerrill Company, a book publisher based in Indiana.73 Bobbs-Merrill owned the
copyright to “The Castaway,” a popular novel first published in May 1904.74 In an
attempt to control the retail price, the publisher placed a notice on every copy of the the
book, which read: “The price of this book at retail is $1 net. No dealer is licensed to sell it
72

STEVEN D. COX, THE TITANIC STORY: HARD CHOICES, DANGEROUS DECISIONS 112 (Open Court
1999) (depicting a photograph of Isidor and his wife, Ida, both of whom tragically died in the infamous
sinking of the Titanic ocean liner. According to the accounts of survivors, Ida had the opportunity to escape
on a lifeboat, but refused to leave her husband’s side.); JOHN WILLIAM LEONARD & ALBERT NELSON
MARQUIS, WHO’S WHO IN AMERICA 702 (A.N. Marquis & Company 1899).
73
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIANAPOLIS 336 (David
J. Bodenhammer & Robert G. Barrows, eds., Indiana University Press 1994).
74
HALLIE ERMINIE RIVES, THE CASTAWAY (The Bobbs-Merrill Company 1904).
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at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the
copyright.”75 Straus, aware of the notice, sold “The Castaway” at Macy’s for 89 cents a
copy.76
Conceding that the notice was not a contract,77 the Bobbs-Merrill Company
argued instead that Straus had violated its exclusive right to “vend” under the Copyright
Act then in force.78 Initially, the Supreme Court struggled to liken the case to prior suits
involving notices stamped onto patented articles. Unable to draw apt analogies, the Court
approached the issue as a case of first instance.79
First, the Court explained that the “main purpose” of copyright was to ensure
that authors had an exclusive right to reproduce works.80 The Court then reasoned that,
inherent to the act of replication is the distinction between incorporeal expressions and
the solid, tangible articles in which expressions can be fixed.81 This division colored the
Court’s statutory analysis of the phrase, “sole right to vend,” leading to the decision that
the imposition of resale terms via a notice exceeded a copyright holder’s powers.82
Backing up this decision was the Court’s construction of the Constitutional basis for
copyright—“to promote the progress of Science and useful Arts.”83 A retail and used
market for copyrighted works would respect this goal by encouraging the free flow of
creative expression. However, the court remained neutral on the question of whether the
same result could not be achieved by a license.84
Just one year later, Congress embraced the Bobbs-Merrill decision in the
Copyright Act of 1909. The Act elaborated on the tangible/intangible divide identified by
the Supreme Court:
[A] copyright is distinct from the property in the material object
copyrighted, and the sale . . . of the material object shall not constitute a
transfer of the copyright, nor shall the assignment of the copyright
constitute a transfer of the title to the material object . . . [N]othing in this
Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy
of a copyrighted work.85
The legislative history of this section reflects that lawmakers believed copyright owners
should not be able to exercise control over articles once they are in the stream of
commerce.86 However, if the purpose of this legislation was to discourage price-fixing, it
is odd that Congress did not address the question of whether a copyright owner could
control secondary-market sales by contract.87
75

Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 341.
Id. at 342.
77
Shrink-wrap licenses and other pendant agreements are discussed later in this section.
78
Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350 (“There is no claim in this case of contract limitation, nor license
agreement controlling the subsequent sales of the book.”); Id. at 343.
79
Id. at 346.
80
Id. at 347 (“[I]t is evident that to secure the author the right to multiply copies of his work may be
said to have been the main purpose of the copyright statutes.”).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 350.
83
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8; Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 346.
84
Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 351.
85
The Copyright Act of 1909 § 41, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075.
86
H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 19 (1909).
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Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1472 (2004).
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The question remained unaddressed by the courts and Congress through the
incorporation of the First Sale Doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1976.88 Some clarity
came, if only in dicta, in the 1998 Supreme Court decision of Quality King Distributors,
Inc. v. L’Anza Research International, Inc.89 L’Anza, a company that sold shampoo in
America and abroad, sued Quality King for importing their products from Europe and
reselling them in California at a discounted rate.90 L’Anza’s legal “hook” for a copyright
claim was based upon the artwork and imagery printed on their shampoo bottles.91 While
the decision focused on importation questions, the Court noted with approval that L’anza
contracted with its domestic distributors to control how and where its products were sold
at retail in the United States.92
Licensing usage rights to copyrighted works, rather than transferring ownership
in the works themselves remained a viable route around the First Sale Doctrine. Because
the law only extends to a copy “owner,” mere licensees arguably have no right to resell or
rent-out copies of works.93
The limits of this reasoning were explored in the 1977 case of United States v.
Wise.94 There, a man named Woodrow Wise was charged with criminal copyright
infringement for selling protected film reels to collectors.95 The reels, which included the
classic films, “Funny Girl” and “American Graffiti,”96 had initially been distributed by
Warner Brothers to military bases, television studios and prominent members of the film
industry. The government argued that Wise was not protected by the First Sale Doctrine
because studios had never “sold” the reels, but had instead distributed them under
licenses that forbid resale.
The Ninth Circuit saw the question of ownership in economic terms. The Court
refused to doggedly enforce the studio “licenses” merely because it was claimed that a
property interest had not been transferred. Instead, the Court focused on the underlying
economic realities of the exchange. In cases where recipients were under no obligation to
return the reels, a sale was found.97 This decision and its progeny revealed an important
limitation to contracting-around the First Sale Doctrine.
At the dawn of the digital age, the distinction between tangible and intangible
property, a first-sale foundation recognized in Bobbs-Merrill, became blurred. The
problem first arose in the form of software rentals in the early 1980s. Although software
was treated as copyrightable expression, the First Sale Doctrine in force at the time
permitted copy owners to rent or lease program copies.98 Fears that this would facilitate

88

Copyright Act of 1976 §109, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 1976 Stat. 22.
Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 143 (1998).
90
Id. at 138-39.
91
Id. at 135.
92
Id. at 143. Even if distributors violated these terms, L’Anza could just refuse to sell to them. The
dynamics are different in the consumer market.
93
§109, 1976 Stat. 22.
94
United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977).
95
Id. at 1183-84.
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Id. at 1184.
97
Id. at 1191-92.
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See generally S. REP. NO. 101-265 (1990) (discussing the problem of software renting).
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rampant copyright infringement led Congress to amend the First Sale Doctrine in 1990,
excluding the rental of software.99
By that time however, the software industry had already found its own solution:
shrink-wrap licenses. Like Bobbs-Merrill, which stamped its notice on copies of “The
Castaway,” software firms began placing restrictive resale limitations into their boxed
software. However, unlike the book notices, these were carefully- crafted contracts that
became active when consumers broke a box’s cellophane wrapping. Although judicial
enforcement of this mode of assent initially wavered, shrink-wrap licenses were
eventually held to be enforceable.100
Today, Internet distribution has made it convenient for software vendors to
incorporate licenses directly into their products. So-called “click-wrap” licensing is
familiar to anyone who has downloaded and installed a computer program: A set of terms
and conditions appear above a button labeled, “I Agree” or “I Accept.” Courts have
generally treated click-wrap as a valid mode of assent, only finding invalidity where
terms were not presented clearly and where assent seemed ambiguous.101
Digital media services like Amazon's Kindle Store use click-wrap licenses with
the effect of limiting First Sale Rights. For example, the Kindle's terms of service state
that downloads may be used “solely for . . . personal, non-commercial use.”102 The
motivation behind such licenses appears to be two-fold: First, like software firms of the
early 1980s, digital media distributors are trying to discourage rampant illegal
duplication. But perhaps a more significant motivation is the same that drove BobbsMerrill to control secondary-sales: a fear of getting undercut. A thriving “used” market in
digital media could be exceptionally damaging to online distributors.
Of course, the case of Wise suggests that the right to resell cannot be defeated
by crafty licensing alone. That decision showed that courts will sometimes look to the
underlying economic realities of transactions to determine whether copy ownership
exists. There, “licensees” who were permitted to retain copies indefinitely were treated as
copy owners. More recent decisions have applied Wise to the world of digital products.
Absence of time limits or term of possession; pricing and payment schemes based on perunit costs and not duration; licenses that principally serve to protect intangible copyrights
rather than tangible rights in the chattel—any of these factors could lead to a finding of
copy ownership and first sale rights.103
Yet, a general fogginess persisted with respect to the meaning of the First Sale
Doctrine in the growing world of digital media. Seeking clarity, Congress recently
commissioned a study that addressed the question of “whether the conduct of transmitting
[a] work digitally, so that another person receives a copy of the work, falls within the
scope of the [first sale] defense.”104 Noting that digitally transferring media over the
99

Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 109; Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, 104 Stat 5089 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994)).
100
See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (1996) (holding such a license enforceable for reasons
of marketplace efficiency).
101
See e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2002).
102
AMAZON.COM INC., AMAZON KINDLE: LICENSE AGREEMENT AND TERMS OF USE, § 3,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=200144530.
103
See, e.g., Dak Indus., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 66 F.3d 1091, 1095-96 (1995).
104
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 78-79 (Aug. 2001), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf.
Vol. 15

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

No. 243

2010

Mattioli, Cooling-Off and Secondary Markets

244

Internet inevitably creates new copies, the Report concluded that digital transfers violate
the exclusive right of reproduction and thus are not protected by the First Sale Doctrine
as it exists in the Copyright Act.105
In the years that followed, Congress has tried to pass legislation that would
facilitate the legal transfer of digital media in a secondary market.106 The BALANCE
Act,107 a 2003 bill that that was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary in
2005, includes provisions that would legalize the sale and transfer of a digital media file,
so long as the owner’s copy was destroyed in the process:108
Section 109 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end the following:
(f) The privileges prescribed by subsections (a) and (c) apply in a case in
which the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord of a work in a digital
or other nonanalog format, or any person authorized by such owner, sells
or otherwise disposes of the work by means of a transmission to a single
recipient, if the owner does not retain the copy or phonorecord in a
retrievable form and the work is so sold or otherwise disposed of in its
original format.109
Of course, such provisions on their own would not prevent digital media
distributors from forbidding transfers through license agreements. Taking this into
consideration, the bill dramatically called for the end of click-wrap licensing in the realm
of digital media: “When a digital work is distributed to the public subject to
nonnegotiable license terms, such terms shall not be enforceable under the common laws
or statues of any State to the extent that they restrict of limit any of the limitations on
exclusive rights under this title.”110 Whether or not it ever passes into law, the
BALANCE Act may be a glimpse of the future of digital resale in America.
Since the time of Isidor Straus, the First Sale Doctrine has prevented copyright
holders from directly controlling secondary market sales. This lack of control has posed a
threat to digital distributors, whose products are particularly vulnerable to wrongful
replication and distribution. Evading the resale issue altogether, such distributors
continue to require users to “click” their way to licensure, rather than true copy
ownership. However, click-wrap licenses may only be a temporary dodge: judicial
reluctance to enforce “licenses” grounded upon sale-like behavior, combined with the
possibility of future consumer-friendly legislation could force distributors to face the
challenges of digital first sale.
105

Id. at 80.
See Henry Sprott Long III, Commentary, Reconsidering the “Balance” of the “Digital First Sale”
Debate: Re-examining The Case For A Statutory Digital First Sale Doctrine To Facilitate Second-Hand
Digital Media Markets, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1183, 1195 (2008).
107
Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations (BALANCE) Act,
H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. (2003) (reintroduced in the 109th Congress as H.R. 4536) (also titled, “To amend
title 17, United States Code, to safeguard the rights and expectations of consumers who lawfully obtain
digital entertainment.”).
108
This is known as a “forward-and-delete” scheme, and is discussed in greater detail later in this
article.
109
The Balance Act, Section 4.
110
Id. at Section 3(b).
106

Vol. 15

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

No. 244

2010

Mattioli, Cooling-Off and Secondary Markets

245

B. First Sale in Europe
In contrast to the US, the European Union has developed special resale rules for
works distributed online. The WIPO Copyright Treaty (“WCT”)111 and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”),112 both adopted in 1996, clearly
distinguish between works distributed by tangible and intangible means. Under Article 6
of the WCT, first sale (known in Europe as “exhaustion”) applies to “fixed copies that
can be put into circulation as tangible objects.”113 Article 8 does not extend this right to
works transmitted “by wire or wireless means . . . in such a way that members of the
public may access [them] from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.”114
Similar rules exist exclusively for audio recordings, under the WPPT.115
In harmony with these treaties, the European Commission promulgated the
European Union Copyright Directive (“EUCD”) in 2001.116 Article 3 orders member
states to provide copyright holders with an exclusive right to distribute works over the
Internet. As Section 3(3) states, “The rights . . . shall not be exhausted by any act of
communication to the public or making available to the public as set out in this
Article.”117
Careful readers might assume that this legislation only prevents the public from
using the Internet as a vehicle for conveying “used” media. In fact, the EUCD’s first sale
restriction goes much deeper. The directive explicitly treats works originally purchased
online as, in a sense, fruits of a poisoned tree: “The question of exhaustion does not arise
in the case of services and online services in particular. This also applies with regard to a
material copy of a work or other subject-matter made by a user of such a service with the
consent of the rightholder.”118 Thus, a European consumer may not resell digital media
purchased online, even if she first copies the works to a tangible medium—e.g., a blank
CD.
European nations have enforced these restrictions. In Italy, the directive was
implemented on April 29, 2003. Under this law, distribution of works online (referred to
as “communication”) does not exhaust the owner’s ability to control subsequent transfers
of copies.119 Similarly, the UK’s Copyright and Related Rights Regulations of 2003 set
forth first sale rights for copies of works “put into circulation.”120 However, this
111

WIPO Copyright Treaty, Adopted Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 828 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter WCT] available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html.
112
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Adopted Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17,
2186
U.N.T.S.
38542
[hereinafter
WPPT]
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html.
113
WCT, Art. 6, n. 5.
114
WCT, Art. 8.
115
Compare WCT, Art. 12, with WPPT, Art. 14.
116
Council Directive 2001/29, The Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights
in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10-19.
117
Id. art. 3.
118
Id. ¶ 29.
119
See Italy Implements Directive on Copyright in the Information Society, SIB PRIMA, (Società
Italiana Brevetti), June 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.sib.it/images/stories/allegati/newsletterENG/sibprima06_06copyrightdesigns.pdf.
120
See DIGITAL MEDIA PROJECT, THE BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY AT HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL, ITUNES: HOW COPYRIGHT, CONTRACT, AND TECHNOLOGY SHAPE THE BUSINESS OF DIGITAL
MEDIA—A CASE STUDY, 61 (2004), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/itunes.
Vol. 15

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

No. 245

2010

Mattioli, Cooling-Off and Secondary Markets

246

provision does not appear to include works transmitted “by communication to the public”
via the Internet.121 To clear up any confusion, the UK Copyright Office has stated that,
“exhaustion of rights is a concept normally only associated with the right to control
distribution of tangible copies of protected works.”122
The EU’s statutory division between physical goods and “communications”
suggests a vision of the Internet as a broadcast medium, rather than a distribution
channel.123 However, as discussed ahead, the economic advantages of digital resale may
cause that vision to change.
C. Digital Resale: Economic Benefits
At the most observable level, markets for second-hand goods encourage retail
price competition. The Supreme Court recognized this when it established the First Sale
Doctrine in Bobbs-Merrill.124 There, a publisher was prohibited from fixing retail prices,
in part because doing so would have forced consumers to pay greater than the market
demanded. In a market where consumers may choose to resell works, price competition
can help drive costs to lower levels that appropriately match demand.
In theory, a digital resale market would encourage even greater retail benefits.
For example, presently, only a handful of online retailers (e.g., Amazon, iTunes, eMusic,
etc.) have struck digital distribution contracts with record companies. A digital resale
market that permitted online resale might not only drive prices down, but could also
allow more online distributors to compete. This could result in a new generation of small
online businesses drawing large revenues by expertly serving small markets on a global
level.125
Digital resale could also benefit consumers by facilitating the exchange of
“used” media. As with cooling-off periods, the benefits of this activity can be understood
by considering consumer behavior: A person deciding to purchase a new home or a new
car will typically try to estimate likely resale value. Built into this assessment is an
assumption that the transaction costs associated with finding buyers and transferring
ownership are low compared to the total resale value the seller stands to recover. By
facilitating nearly effortless transactions between buyers and sellers across the globe, the
Internet has encouraged similar activity in markets for less valuable goods (one need only
look to the overwhelming success of auction websites, such as eBay, for evidence of
this). A resale market for digital goods would impose transaction costs that approach
zero.126 For example, a seller transferring a “used” digital copy of a Beatles album would
121
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conceivably only need to go through a small amount of trouble to find and transfer the
album to a willing buyer over the Internet.
The ability to resell downloaded texts could be particularly meaningful to
students. In American colleges and universities, the price of textbooks is extremely
high.127 To help offset these costs, students regularly resell their textbooks after the end
of a semester. This represents a major advantage that paper books presently have over
digital texts. If digital resale remains unavailable, the economic advantages of traditional
books could pose a roadblock to the adoption of electronic texts in America’s schools.128
Of course, the fact that digital media does not degrade over time could lead concerned
retailers to raise their prices.129 While this possibility should be a cause for concern, it is
helpful to consider economic forces that would likely push retail prices in the opposite
direction. For example, a used digital media market could benefit distributors and
copyright holders by promoting increased sales in the primary market. A consumer who
would not have downloaded a twenty dollar movie in the past might make the purchase if
the option to easily resell the work existed.
A used digital media marketplace might also encourage distributors to innovate
by providing interesting new shopping services. Many distributors today provide
customized recommendations based on individual users’ prior purchases. This concept
could be taken further. For example, online media services could incorporate social
networking features that recommend books, albums, or movies based on the collections
of a user’s social contacts. Another avenue for innovation in digital distribution is the
incorporation of advertising.130 For example, e-book retailers might someday offer books
that are subsidized by ads.131 Just like today’s web-based newspapers (e.g.,
NYTimes.com), these e-books would be free of charge to users willing to endure
occasional advertisements. The publishing industry might take this concept one step
further still: In a futuristic form of “product placement,” future advertising-supported ebooks might subtly incorporate ads directly into their narratives. Such an arrangement
would require the cooperation of authors, and could raise challenging questions
concerning artistic expression and originality.132 The incorporation of recommendations,
127
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social networking services, and advertising are just a few avenues that publishers and
distributors could explore to compete with a digital resale market.
A digital resale market could also promote more transactions by making more
works available. Like books taken out of print, digital works that are only appreciated by
small niches of the public may fade from the market due to low demand. Alternatively, a
copyright holder may remove a work from the market in order to increase demand. For
example, the Walt Disney Company periodically places its most popular films in the
metaphorical “Disney Vault,” where copies are not produced until demand rises.133 A
secondary market for digital media would help ensure that copyright holders could not so
completely control the availability of their works.134
Permission to resell and lend downloaded media would also allow libraries to
purchase more digital media. In a 2005 public hearing before the Copyright Office,
representatives of the American Library Association explained that, in the absence of a
digital resale right, libraries simply have no means of lending-out such works.135 As a
result, most libraries in the country still purchase traditional physical media and are not
directing funds into the digital marketplace.136 Experts believe that this is a very large
untapped market.137
D. Digital Resale: Digital Rights Management
Although European consumers have no legal right to resell downloaded media,
online resale remains a possibility in the United States. In light of this, and the economic
benefits that it could bring, it is important to consider how digital resale could be
accomplished.
There are two primary ways that a downloaded work could be reassigned:
Transmission over a network (e.g., the Internet) and transfer by physical means (e.g., a
blank CD). As Congress recognized in its 2001 Report on Digital First Sale, the most
glaring problem with reselling a work online is that doing so creates multiple
intermediate copies. Data traversing the Internet passes through many intermediary
switches and routers, many of which retain temporary copies of the information. Under
U.S. law, such duplicates, even if only temporarily stored in RAM, are capable of
violating a copyright holder’s exclusive right to reproduction.138
133
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However, the Congressional Report on Digital First Sale recognized that
technological systems exist that could, for practical purposes, resolve this problem by
ensuring the deletion of the original copy after it has been transferred. Such DRM
schemes are known as “forward-and-delete.”139 Like a fax machine combined with a
paper shredder, such a scheme would instantly delete local copies of songs or movies
upon transmission.140 A more primitive approach, perhaps with lower risks of piracy,
would involve the transfer of a work to storage media, such as a blank CD or memory
card. In this scenario, a “copy-and-delete” approach analogous to the forward-and-delete
scheme could ensure that sellers would not retain local copies.
Another option would not involve actual deletion, but would instead incorporate
a password-like access key.141 Media distributed under such a scheme could only be
played by the individual to most recently register the access key with a central server.142
Thus, a song could be “resold” by mere transfer of the access key and the digital file
itself. However, a weakness with this approach lies in its reliance on a centralized
authentication server. If the centralized system were to ever fail, consumers would be
unable to carry-out transfers.143
E. Summary and Implications
The Constitution proposes copyright as an incentive to advance human
expression, not a right to control the countless tributaries and headwaters of commerce.
Recognizing this, American courts have long refused to grant copyright holders absolute
dominion over their works. The first sale doctrine, first codified in 1909, marks a
perimeter beyond which copyright alone cannot reach.
However, in the 1980s, software distributors found a way to overstep first sale
with the aid of contracts. Aware that the First Sale Doctrine only applies to the “owners”
of copies, these firms used pendent licenses to restructure sales as mere “licenses” to use.
In their wisdom, American courts have suggested this legal fiction should only go so far:
when the underlying economic structure of a transaction suggests the presence of a sale,
labels are ignored and copy ownership should be found. Unfortunately though, most
click-wrap licenses used by digital media distributors have gone unchallenged and
licensing remains a reality of the digital marketplace. But American consumers are still
pushing Congress for clarity. The BALANCE Act, or a similarly-modeled future bill,
could invalidate click-wrap licensing of downloaded media and endorse forward-anddelete transfer schemes.
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In contrast, European legislators explicitly reject the notion that consumers may
have a right to resell downloaded media. Under WIPO treaties and EC directives, many
European nations have viewed such copies as “communications” rather than goods. In
many ways, this stance seems short-sighted: digital resale could lead to lower prices,
greater service to niche markets, and the increased investment of libraries. These
economic benefits, combined with America’s more open attitude toward the resale of
downloaded works, could lead to a digital secondary market in America.
It is interesting to ponder the economic and legal impact that Europe might
experience if digital first sale became part of American law. As with digital product
returns, it is unlikely that online distributors would wish to manage bifurcated systems
that serve European consumers differently that Americans. Thus, an American right to
resell could, in a sense, seep into the European market, not as legislation, but merely in
the form of business infrastructure. Ultimately, this consumer-friendly policy might sit
comfortably alongside Europe’s vision of digital cooling-off laws.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This article began by considering the widespread criticism that digital media
distributors have received for restricting consumer choice. Why was an apology and a
refund not enough to satisfy those impacted by Amazon’s remote book deletion? Why
did Steve Jobs, the founder of an online media empire, advocate the end of DRM? The
reasons set forth by pundits, plaintiffs, and increasingly by regulators, is that distributors
should not be permitted to block the pathway to consumer choice. And yet, as
gatekeepers, distributors also hold the keys to restoring consumer freedoms that have
been lost across the digital divide.
There is an inverse symmetry between American and European cooling-off and
first sale laws. Cooling-off laws in the United States are based upon the narrow
circumstance of pushy door-to- door salesmen. In contrast, European cooling-off laws are
more expansive, and recognize the fact that distance contracts can be just as improvident
as those made face-to-face. At the same time, while European regulators have explicitly
excluded a right to resell downloaded works, American lawmakers have left the
possibility open.
In American and in Europe, making digital cooling-off periods and secondary
markets a reality would require cooperation between digital media distributors and
lawmakers. Specifically, distributors would need to adopt DRM systems like those
discussed earlier in this Article. Ideally, any such standards would be used industry-wide,
to ensure easy exchanges between the customers of competing services.
This level of interoperability may only be possible through legislated
standardization. While the subject of standardization is beyond the scope of this article, it
is valuable to briefly note the challenges that lawmakers might face. Policy makers
typically follow one of three approaches in developing, selecting and deploying
technology standards:144 they may shape the fine-grained details of a technology, ask
private bodies or firms to develop standards (usually involving a “beauty contest”), or
144
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they may allow standards to compete in the open market.145 Choosing the best path is a
difficult task. Too little guidance can lead to a market of splintered technologies; too
much control could unwisely force consumers and firms to accept inferior technology.146
Advocates of regulation often point to the successful deployment of mobile
phone standards in Europe during the late 1980s. Unlike their American counterparts,
European regulators mandated the entire mobile industry adopt a single digital standard:
GSM.147 The decision has been cited as a prime reason why Europe jumped ahead of the
United States in cellphone adoption during the 1990s.148 Consumers enjoyed greater
confidence that their phones would work well throughout Europe, and manufacturers
enjoyed the benefits of scale economies for a single technology.149
Of course, governments have had failures in setting standards as well. A strong
argument for regulatory minimalism can be based on the development of HDTV
standards in the 1980s. In a remarkable case of shortsightedness, Japanese regulators
endorsed a completely analog (non-digital) standard for high definition television.150
Unfortunately, the technology was obsolete almost as soon as it was implemented. By the
time manufacturers and consumers had bought-in to this system, the digital revolution
was well underway.
Given such failures, it may be best to take a moderate approach. Independent
bodies have had great success in developing and maintaining many de jure standards that
internet users rely upon.151 For example, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) has successfully overseen the development of the 802.11 (Wi-Fi)
standard for wireless internet access.152 Similarly, the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) is responsible for TCP/IP—the lowest-level standard upon which the entire
Internet operates.153
Based on these examples, it would be wisest for regulators to assign the
development of digital returns and resale technology standards to an independent body.
The organization could be selected by way of a contest, in which various organizations
would compete by submitting DRM proposals to a board of judges. To avoid mistakes
like Japan’s HDTV debacle, regulators would be advised to refrain from requiring
specific technologies. Instead, broad performance requirements would likely lead to the
strongest standards.
If properly implemented, the economic benefits of digital returns and resale
could be substantial. A right to return downloaded media would likely increase economic
efficiency and consumer spending in the online market. Online media resale could lead to
lower prices, greater service to niche markets, wider adoption of digital textbooks by
students, and massive investments from libraries.
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The Internet is a ghost world, a place without weight or position. Amazingly,
copyright holders and media distributors are conquering these ethereal plains; they have
built storefronts that draw consumers from across the globe. And yet, a critical issue has
gone ignored: the alienation of digital property. In America and Europe, owners of
physical media enjoy varying rights of return and resale, both of which yield economic
benefits. Potentially, cooling-off periods and secondary markets for digital goods could
yield even greater economic and social benefits. The first step in achieving this goal must
be to refresh and refocus the debate concerning digital rights management. Lawmakers,
media distributors, copyright holders, and the public would benefit by recognizing that,
alongside their perils, DRM systems have the potential to bring consumer choice to the
digital domain.
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